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Introduction
It is possible that local public libraries are housing Trojan Horses
waiting to simultaneously shield print pornographers while attacking
online pornographers. Jerome Evensen's defense to Arizona's charge
that he was distributing materials harmful to minors demonstrates
how community standards have become entangled in the world wide
web. Mr. Evensen argued that his print materials did not violate
community standards because children could easily download
materials "infinitely more graphic," (i.e., patently offensive) than his
at the local public library.' Arizona defines materials harmful to
minors as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever
form... when both: (a) To the average adult applying
contemporary state standards with respect to what is suitable to
minors, it both: (i) Appeals to the prurient interest, when taken as a
whole.... (ii) Portrays the description or representation in a
patently offensive way. (b) Taken as a whole does not have serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value to minors.'
Mr. Evensen argued that if the public library, and thus the
community, is making more obscene materials available to minors,
the community must believe such materials are suitable for minors.
Libraries potentially present a particularly perplexing problem.
Communities can constitutionally filter a child's access to the
Internet! A district court in the eastern district of Virginia ruled that
libraries can not, however, constitutionally filter all access to the
Internet.4 Proponents of filtering library Internet access claim that
blocking children's access to unfiltered computers is an impossible
task because many libraries lack the resources necessary to monitor
computer usage. Thus, a community whose libraries provide Internet
1. Pornographers use Library to Attack Community Standards (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.filteringfacts.org/arizona.htm>. The web site, however, listed an erroneous
name for the party, correct information was gathered in Interview with Richard J.
Hertzburger, former counsel for Jerome Evensen, (Feb. 16, 1999).
2. A.R.S. 13-3501(1) (1998). This law is almost identical to the one upheld by the
Supreme Court:
[Having] that quality of representation... of nudity ... (which) ...
predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interests of minors,
and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors and (iii) is utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968).
3. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 2
F. Supp.2d 783, 796-97 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun I].
4. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library,
24 F. Supp.2d 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter Loudoun II].
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access may be accused of providing and tolerating obscenity, thereby
eradicating its community standards. How long will it be before a
print pornographer claims not to be in violation of community
standards because adults may access more obscene material with the
community's blessing?
It is likely that this defense will be used again; Mr. Evensen has
claims that "all the porno lawyers support me."5 Both print and online
pornographers benefit from a broader definition of community
because the likelihood that their material is offensive diminishes as
community borders expand. Although the web may aid the e-
pornographer by its potential to expand communities, it also has the
potential of wreaking havoc upon an e-pornographer's business.
Current technology does not permit web masters or bulletin board
operators to prevent members of predetermined American
communities from accessing their information, yet the law permits
their prosecution in any forum where the obscene material touches.6
The seminal cases on obscenity law were decided when the
Internet's potential, or even the widespread usage of home
computers, was unimaginable. The Court assumed that communities
could control what material they would allow into its borders and that
pornographers could control the destination of their materials. The
web does not allow this control, yet the law is still applied as if it is
possible to supervise importing and exporting materials over Internet
connections.
This note will explore the chaos that the Internet can potentially
bring to the definition of community standards and the hurdles that
modern e-pornographers face. This will be accomplished by
examining the twin foci of how communities can protect themselves
from Mr. Evensen, and how online pornographers can protect
themselves in an age where any adult with a modem can access their
materials. Section one will discuss the basics of First Amendment
Law. Section two will analyze the flaws in these doctrines, as applied
to the Internet. Section three will conclude that the only way for both
communities and e-pornographers to gain control is for the law to
delegate responsibility to the person who accessed the materials.
5. Pornographers use Library, supra note 1.
6. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996).
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The Root of the Problem:
Legal Regulation of Speech
Few areas of law are as convoluted as constitutional law, and few
areas of the morass of constitutional law have seen as much litigation,
controversy, and change as the First Amendment. This section
provides a brief overview of permissible and impermissible restraints
on speech, how obscenity is treated, and concludes with a discussion
of Internet filtering.
A. What Restraints On Speech Are Permissible?
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech."'
The Supreme Court has interpreted the free speech clause to
mean that the government "has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.
'8
Thus, content-based laws, which regulate the subject matter of
speech, are presumptively invalid.9 They will only be upheld if the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest"' or regulates one of the unprotected categories of speech,
such as obscenity."
Content-neutral regulations restrict speech regardless of its
content and are subject to a lower degree of scrutiny. When
regulating speech in a public forum or a limited public forum, the
courts will uphold reasonable time, place, and manner restraints that
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental goal. 2 Such
restraints will only be considered constitutional if they "leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of information."' 3
B. What Means of Regulating Speech Are Impermissible?
Courts will strike down speech restrictions when invalid
regulatory means are used. Governments may not pass over-broad
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
9. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victim's
Board, 502 U.S. 105,115 (1992).
10. See id. at 117.
11. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,481 (1957).
12. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
13. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1262 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1984)).
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laws which do not "aim specifically at evils within the allowable area
of [government] control, but.., sweep within their ambit other
activities that constitute" protected rights." A law will be void due to
vagueness if persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application."' 5 Laws that do not
provide "sufficient definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices" are
impermissibly vague. 6 Prior restraints on speech are administrative or
judicial orders that prohibit speech on the basis of its content before it
occurs. 17 Prior restraints are presumptively void and "may be struck
down even though the particular expression involved could validly be
restricted through subsequent criminal punishment."' 8
C. Where does Obscenity Fall?
The First Amendment guarantees free speech, but not all forms
of speech are protected. Obscenity is unprotected, as it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance."2 ° However, adult access to
non-obscene pornography is protected. Courts have had a difficult
time distinguishing the two. In Jacobellis v. Ohio22 Justice Stewart
penned his now famous statement on obscenity: "I could never
succeed in [articulating the definition] intelligibly... [but] I know it
when I see it."23 This statement illustrates the difficulty of defining
obscenity in the abstract and how subjectively its definition may be
applied. Without asking Justice Stewart his opinion, it would be
impossible to know if he was easily offended or tolerant when it came
to pornographic materials.
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the Supreme Court
adopted a three prong test in Miller v. California to define obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
14. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
15. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
16. Jodan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951).
17. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
18. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1203 (13th ed. 1997).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
20. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
21. See id. at 487.
22. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
23. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
24literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The Court realized that requiring states to "structure obscenity
proceedings around evidence of a national community standard
would be an exercise in futility."25 The Court further reasoned that,
"[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York City."26
In Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court further explained its views on
community standards:
[Tihe Constitution does not require that juries be instructed in state
obscenity cases to apply the standards of a hypothetical statewide
community .... We also agree with the ... implicit approval of the
trial court's instructions directing jurors to apply 'community
standards' without specifying what 'community.'... [it is]
constitutionally permissible to permit juries to rely on the
understanding of the community from which they came.
The jury had convicted Jenkins for showing the film "Carnal
Knowledge" in Albany, Georgia.2" Ironically, the court gave the jury
wide discretion in determining what the community standard was, but
overturned its finding that the film was obscene.29 Considering
evidence such as the film was considered one of the ten best of the
year and that the actress had received an academy award," the Court
concluded the film was not a "public portrayal of hard core sexual
conduct for its own sake," and therefore did not lack serious value."
Thus, community standards apply to the first two prongs of the Miller
test, but not the third.
D. What is Internet Filtering?
Filtering software is designed to prohibit access to selected
Internet resources. The American Library Association defines the
purpose of filtering software as "restrict[ing] access to Internet
24. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
25. Id. at 30.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
28. See id. at 154.
29. See id. at 161.
30. See id. at 158.
31. Id. at 161 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 35).
32. See Emily Whitfield & Ann Beeson, Censorship in a Box: Blocking Software is
Wrong for Libraries, 16 CABLE TV & NEW MEDIA L. & FIN. 1 (1998).
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content. ... "33 The American Library Association has further stated
that: "Libraries are responsible for serving a broad and diverse
community with different preferences and views. Blocking Internet
sites is antithetical to library missions because it requires the library
to limit information access."34
There are three major methods of filtering access to Internet
sites.35 Software can limit access to a group of preselected sites, but
this would not be effective because of the overwhelming resources
that libraries would require to block all offensive sites.36 The second
method, which is preferred by the American Library Association,
only limits access to sites that involve "clearly illegal material--for
example, sites already adjudicated obscene."37 The final, and most
common approach is filtering by content.38 Filters are most often
criticized for blocking resources that do not contain objectionable
materials, while also failing to block objectionable materials. 9
The Loudoun court determined that public libraries are limited
public fora, which are compatible with the expressive activity of
accessing and communicating information over the Internet.4° The
court further found that restrictions on content should be subject to
strict scrutiny.4" The court also rejected the argument that filtering
was nothing more than a time, place, manner restriction, because such
an analysis is inapplicable to restrictions of speech based on content.42
33. Intellectual Freedom Committee, American Library Ass'n, Statement on Library
Use of Filtering Software (July 1, 1997) (visited Feb 3, 1999) <http://www.ala.org/
alaorg/oif/filtstm.html>.
34. Id.
35. See Janet L. Balas, Libraries, the Internet and the First Amendment, COMPUTERS
LIBRARIAN, Jan 1998, at 18, 20.
36. See id.
37. Carl Solano, Libraries Are the New Battleground for Fights Over Porn on the
Internet, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24,1997, at B8.
38. See Balas, supra note 35 at 20.
39. See e.g. Solano, supra note 37, at B8; Whiltfield & Beeson, supra note 32, at 1.
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II
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree:
Why Traditional Obscenity Law Will Not Produce Justice on
the Internet
Americans' use of the Internet has exploded over the last ten
years. Miller,43 the foremost case in obscenity, was decided when few
could imagine the technological changes that would affect society in a
few years. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
dissented in Miller." The Justices' concerns took concrete form for
online pornographers when Thomas45 was decided in 1993. Thomas
clearly demonstrates the problem of trying to define a community in
the Internet context, and when taken in conjunction with a Ninth
Circuit copyright case, demonstrates that e-pornographers potentially
face distribution of obscenity charges in every American jurisdiction.
A district court in the Eastern District of Virginia decided the
most important cases regarding Internet filtering in public libraries.46
It forbade the community to restrict adult access to the Internet.
Communities are thereby required to provide their residents with a
means of accessing obscenity, and the court appears to have
emasculated the discretion that it had traditionally granted
communities.
A. E-Pornographers Face Unlimited Prosecution, Yet Cannot Know All
Community Standards
The main problem with the three-pronged Miller approach47 is
that the first prong is entirely subjective. Until a defendant is before a
jury, there is no way to know how the average twelve people will
define or apply their community standards. Justice Douglas
articulated these concerns in his Miller dissent. It almost seems as if
the Court has altered Justice Stewart's statement to "the jury knows it
when it sees it." The current test, however, is not entirely flawed. It
allows people to define what types of obscenity they will not tolerate
through their legislature.48 It also allows citizens to determine how
43. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15.
44. See id. 37-48.
45. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. See Loudoun I, supra note 3, at 783; Loudoun II, supra note 4, at 552.
47. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24.
48. See id. at 25.
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they will define their community.49 The third prong ensures that
works of literature and art will not be unduly censored by requiring
the prosecution to show that the works lack serious value."
1. Prior Determinations of How Communities Will React to Materials Are
Impossible
The Miller test cannot produce true justice in obscenity law
because pornographers cannot make prior determinations of how
communities will define obscenity or offensiveness. Thus
pornographers cannot effectively control the distribution of obscene
materials into communities, because they may make erroneous
determinations of what the communities will tolerate.
Although he did not foresee the Internet, Justice Douglas
recognized that the law alienating obscenity from First Amendment
protection had to be changed. The problems he discussed have been
exacerbated in the modern age.
Society's attempts to legislate for adults.., have not been
successful. Present laws prohibiting the consensual sale or
distribution of explicit sexual materials to adults are extremely
unsatisfactory in their practical application.... [V]ague and highly
subjective aesthetic, psychological and moral tests do not provide
meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries or
courts.... As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes
erroneously applied.5
After noting that there was no constitutional reason for
alienating obscenity from the Constitution's protection, he found that
a proper reading of the First Amendment prohibited this implied
exception. 2 Sending "men to jail for violating standards they cannot
understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a nation
dedicated to fair trials and due process."53 Further, no one is forcibly
exposed to obscenity and he found the thought that the "First
Amendment permits punishment for ideas that are 'offensive' to a
particular judge or jury" astounding. 4 The First Amendment, he
argued, exists to protect ideas that some may find offensive.55
Douglas attacked the majority's test as fatally flawed. As noted
49. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 157.
50. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24.
51. Id. at 40 (quoting Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 53
(1970)) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 40-44.
53. Id. at 45.
54. Id. at 44.
55. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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above, he felt that the term "offensive" was impermissibly vague and
thus unconstitutional. 6 Implying that offensiveness was not a
standard at all, Justice Douglas questioned how one can possibly
know what another will find offensive. 7 He concluded that the people
are the only ones who have the constitutional power to define
obscenity and should do so through an amendment to the
Constitution. "B
Today, the definition of the word "offensive" as used in the
Miller test is no less vague. Further, people now face charges for
violating standards they cannot understand in any community that
wishes to prosecute them.
2. Miller Applied to Internet Obscenity
Miller's three-pronged test combined with the fact that each jury
defines its community standards, means that each jurisdiction has a
different standard of obscenity. Prosecutors take advantage of this by
choosing the most restrictive forum in which to bring their suit. In
1995, a California couple was charged with violating Tennessee
obscenity laws. 9 Alan and Carleen Thomas operated the Amateur
Action Computer Bulletin Board System which delivered sexually
explicit computer files to their subscribersi 0 The Thomases set up
elaborate safeguards to keep minors from accessing their bulletin
board system ("BBS"). 6' As a prerequisite to membership, applicants
had to fill out a form disclosing the user's address and phone number,
and mail it to the couple.62 Next, the Thomases would call the
applicant to judge whether he or she was over eighteen.63 Though the
BBS advertised some of the women in its computer images as pre-
teenagers, Mr. Thomas went to lengths to make certain they were of
legal age. 6' A postal inspector accessed the BBS from Tennessee and
prosecuted the Thomases in that state. 65
The defendants challenged the Tennessee venue, arguing that
56. See id.
57. See id. at 49.
58. See id.
59. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.
60. See id.




64. See id. at 3.
65. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.
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they did not cause the files to be transmitted to the state.66 Rather, the
inspector had caused the materials to enter the state.67 The court
rejected this argument stating that the government only had to show
that a facility or means of interstate commerce was used to distribute
obscene materials.68 Moreover, the government need not show that
the defendants had knowledge of the destination of each transmittal
when it occurred.6 9 Venue is proper in "every judicial district which
the material touches.,
7
This ruling is troublesome as it suggests that if a member from a
tolerant community travels to a conservative community and chooses
to access a web site or BBS, the provider is subject to suit in the
conservative forum.
The Thomas defendants made the novel argument that a new
definition of community was necessary in light of computer
technology - one based upon the "broad-ranging connections among
people in cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the federal
judicial district of the criminal trial."7 They argued that any other
standard would chill protected speech because BBS operators cannot
select who accesses their materials and therefore, they would have to
limit themselves to the standards of the most restrictive communities.
The court rejected this argument because of the precautions the
Thomases had taken. The defendants required membership in their
BBS and received information regarding what jurisdiction the
member lives in. Therefore, the court found that they could have
restricted membership to applicants in friendly jurisdictions.7 ' The
court relied upon Sable Communications v. F.CC.1 in which the
Supreme Court recognized that distributors of allegedly obscene
materials may be subject to the standards of the varying communities
where their materials were transmitted and noted that the defendants
71were free to tailor their messages.
66. See id. at 709.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 710.
69. See id. at 709.
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1981)).
71. Id. at 711. The Thomases were "really arguing to apply the standards of the
AABBS users themselves. The idea is that they are an insular group of 3,500 pornophiles
who should be allowed to stew in their own smut if they like." WALLACE & MANGAN,
supra note 61 at 33. The authors point out that such a result would effectively repeal
obscenity laws entirely. See id.
72. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712.
73. Sable Communications of California v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
74. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712.
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Thomas implies that a BBS or web site that does not take as
many precautions is more likely to escape suit in a conservative
jurisdiction. Further, the court seems to be requiring BBS operators
to learn what standards govern each community and what materials
each considers to be obscene - an impossible task.
Some sites and BBS operators have attempted to avoid this
problem by the following language:
I am familiar with and I understand the standards and laws of the
community in which I live regarding sexually-oriented media. I
represent that, based on my familiarity with these standards and
laws of my community, by requesting and receiving any of the adult
material on Hustler On-Line, I will not be violating any of these
standards and/or laws. I understand that by accepting the terms of
this Agreement, I will hold Hustler On-Line harmless from any
responsibilities related to my requesting, receiving or possessing
materials contained on its site.
Hustler, like the Thomases, has the ability to block access to
those who live in restrictive communities by requesting information
such as addresses.76 According to Thomas, juries are to be instructed
to apply the contemporary community standards of the community
where the materials are being sent.77 No legal authority suggests that
one who transports obscenity can avoid charges by proving that the
purchaser knew of community standards and consented to violating
them. Even if this is a valid defense, if a patron has an erroneous
understanding of what the community standards are, the online
pornographer will be subject to the community's jurisdiction. Further,
these terms require the visitor to perform the impossible task of
determing whether unseen materials will violate an unknown jury's
subjective understanding of community standards.
Another disturbing aspect of Thomas is that applying its logic to
a recent Ninth Circuit copyright case leads to the conclusion that an
online pornographer's careless error, such as posting a potentially
obscene file on the greeting page of a site, could open the door to
criminal charges or heavy fines.' To succeed on a claim of copyright
infringement, "a plaintiff must prove ownership of a copyright and a
75. Terms & Conditions (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.hustler.com>.
76. Currently, technology does not allow webmasters to prevent an entire state or
city's access to a web site. Without taking precautions such as the Thomases' it is not
possible to verify where a site visitor is located. Interview with Jameson L. Thottam,
Internet Technology Professional Global Med. Supply, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 1,
1999).
77. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
78. See id. at 710-11.
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'copying' of protectable expression."" Copies are defined by the
copyright act as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any
method.... ,80 A work is fixed when it is "sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.",1
The MAI defendant claimed that copies are not made when a
computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to
a computer's RAM, and that thus it was not infringing the plaintiff's
copyright.8' RAM is defined as "[A] computer component in which
data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded .... It is a
property of RAM that when the computer is turned off, the copy of
the program recorded in RAM is lost." 3 The defendant's argument
hinged on the fact that the version of the program residing in RAM
was not fixed, as required by copyright law.' The Ninth Circuit found
that the version of the program residing in RAM could be "perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated," and was a copy for
purposes of the copyright act."
MAI did not involve the Internet, but when a web site is visited,
its contents are stored in the viewer's RAM. Therefore, for purposes
of the Copyright Act a copy has been made. Since a copy has been
made in the viewer's jurisdiction, the pornographer must have
transferred the materials through instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, thereby allowing prosecution in any jurisdiction where an
obscene page has been viewed.86 The mere act of having one's web
site viewed, or allowing access to one's BBS, could subject an e-
pornographer to the jurisdiction of the viewer.
B. The Freedom to Access The Internet at the Public Library
The Loudoun court was the first to face the issue of how the free
speech clause applies to Internet filtering in public libraries.' The
plaintiffs claimed that the library board's decision to restrict access to
79. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993
(quoting S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
80. See id. at 517 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
81. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
82. See id. at 517.
83. See id. at 518 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l., Inc., 594 F. Supp.
617,622 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
84. See id. at 518.
85. Id. at 519.
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (West 1999).
87. See Loudoun I, supra note 3, at 787.
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certain web pages through filtering software was an impermissible
violation of their constitutional rights.88 In its first published opinion,
the court rejected the board's motion for summary judgment and
found strict scrutiny applied to the library's policy.8 In its second
opinion, the court rejected the board's argument that filtering
Internet access was a reasonable time, place, manner restriction and
granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment.'
In determining that strict scrutiny applied, the Loudoun court
relied on Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Sch. Dist. v. Pico.91 In
Pico, a New York district court granted summary judgment to a
school board that had reviewed a number of books accused of being
"anti-American, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy" and decided to
remove the books from the school library.92 The lower court reasoned
that school boards were vested with broad discretion to formulate
educational policy.93 The appellate court reversed, finding this was a
violation of free speech rights.94 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding
that the evidence did not "foreclose the possibility that petitioners'
decision to remove the books rested ... upon disagreement with
constitutionally protected ideas in those books.,
95
The Court began its analysis by explaining that the right to
receive information is inextricably tied to the right to speak, thus the
First Amendment applied.96 Although the state had the discretion to
determine the content of the schools' libraries, 97 it could not
permissibly "contract the spectrum of available knowledge., 98 Access
to ideas allows people to exercise free speech rights in a meaningful
way.99 The Court emphasized that its decision did not affect the
board's discretion to choose books to add to the library,'" and that it
was limited to decisions to remove books.0'
88. See id.
89. See id. at 795.
90. See Loudoun II, supra note 4, at 570.
91. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
92. Id. at 856.
93. See id. at 859-860.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 875.
96. See id. at 867.
97. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Uniform Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico 457 U.S. 853,
870 (1982).
98. Id. at 866 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)).
99. See id. at 868.
100. See id. at 872.
101. See id.
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Loudoun County's attempt at analogizing the Internet to a "vast
interlibrary loan system" and its argument that restricting access to
sites was a choice not to acquire the materials was rejected."2 "Unlike
a library's collection of individual books, the world wide web is a
'single integrated system."" 3 The Internet is equivalent to a set of
encyclopedias and the defendant's policy chose to "black out"
selected articles."° The court based its reasoning on the fact that,
unlike an interlibrary loan system or a purchase of a book, no
"expenditure of library time or resources is required to make a
particular Internet publication available to a patron."'' 5 Rather,
resources must be expended to restrict access. This logic would not
obligate the defendants to act as unwilling conduits of information as
the board need not provide access to the Internet at all.'"
Miller's greatest asset is that it allows communities enormous
discretion to determine what they will and will not tolerate. Pico
granted school libraries the discretion to determine what books they
would provide students." Discretion to determine what is tolerable in
a defined community has played an important role in obscenity law,
and the Loudoun decisions have shattered it by forcing communities
to provide unfiltered Internet access to their adults. Librarians,
patrons, and children may be exposed to images they consider
obscene while passing an Internet terminal. Pornographers, such as
Jerome Evensen, can argue that their most obscene print materials
pale in comparison to what the community has chosen to provide.




The Law Must Adapt to Changes in Society
The public library's status as a place of "free wheeling inquiry"
means that communities choosing to provide Internet access to adults
via their public library may be subject to the accusation that they
tolerate obscenity as they chose to provide it. 8 How then, may a
102. Loudoun I, supra note 3, at 793.
103. Id. at 793 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
104. See id. at 794.
105. Id. at 795.
106. See id.
107. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982).
108. Libraries may constitutionally filter children's access to the Internet to some
extent. However, it may not reduce the adult population's Internet access to what is fit for
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community provide Internet access to its citizens while protecting its
community standards? After all, the citizens of the jurisdiction, acting
through its library board, will have chosen to acquire Internet access
despite all of the publicity regarding the availability of smut on the
net."°
Commentators have proposed a number of solutions to this
problem. Jonathan Wallace and Mark Mangan suggest scrapping
local community standards in favor of a national one."' Douglas
Heumann suggests adding the element of scienter to the Miller test,
i.e. would "a reasonable person believe the material was not
obscene.""' In addition, three other solutions are possible: materials
available at the public library may be excluded from the definition of
community standards because of its special circumstances, the courts
may choose to recognize the world wide web as a unique community
with its own standards as the Thomases' recommended,"2 or the
legislature can recognize the unique position of the Internet in society
and place the focus of obscenity inquiries on the person who chooses
to access the obscenity.
Nationwide standards of obscenity are not viable today for the
same reasons they were not viable when Miller was written in the
1970s."3 Such a standard would impermissibly force "people of Maine
or Mississippi [to] accept the public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas."" 4 Further, the Internet is not limited to the
United States - would it be permissible to force the citizens of Maine
to accept the standards of Paris, or Parisians to accept the standards
of Mississippi? Alternatively, should the United States limit what
countries' sites or what international sites its citizens may access?
Adding the element of scienter to the Miller test is not a viable
children. See Loudoun I, supra note 3, at 796.
109. In response to the argument that public libraries would buy all types of material if
their budgets permitted, Filtering Facts offered a year's subscription to Hustler Magazine
and $250 to cover the costs of processing and circulating the magazine to the first library to
agree to make each issue available to the public. The offer has stood open since August of
1.997 and has still not been accepted. Filtering Facts argues this is because the public is
aware that pornography is "grossly inappropriate" in the library setting. See The Hustler
Challenge (visited Feb. 19, 1999.) <http://www.filteringfacts.org/hustler.htm>.
110. See WALLACE & MANGAN, supra note 61 at 254.
111. See Douglas C. Heumann, United States v. Thomas: Will the Community Standard
be Roadkill on the Information Superhighway? 23 Western State U. L. Rev. 189, 209, 216
(1995) (quoting William B. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex
and the First Amendment, 9 GA L. Rev. 533, 563 (1975)).
112. See generally Thomas, 74 F.3d 701.
113. See Section 1. D. supra.
114. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 32.
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solution. As discussed above, obscenity is defined subjectively, and a
prior determination of what materials will violate community
standards is difficult."5 The best an e-pornographer can do is guess
what the reasonable person will consider non-obscene. Financially
constrained e-pornographers may be forced to limit all of their
materials to what they believe the most restrictive communities will
tolerate. Some materials, however, are so patently offensive that any
distributor should know that no community would tolerate them.
Thus, adding an element of scienter would eliminate a number of
materials such as graphic depictions of rape - but would chill the
distribution of materials which would be tolerated in one jurisdiction,
but not another. Further, prosecutions would be impeded: how can a
prosecutor prove an e-pornographer should have known how a jury
would apply a subjective test?
Excluding all materials available at the public library is clearly an
over-inclusive solution. If a community chooses to provide library
books on topics such as bestiality, incest, sadomasochism, or sodomy,
the jury should take it into consideration. Here, unlike the Internet
filtering case, the community has spent money and resources to
acquire these materials."6 They would not likely have done so had
they not believed that there was a ready audience for these materials,
or that they were appropriate.
This leaves open the Thomases' argument that the world wide
web requires a new definition of community. 7 Such a finding would
prevent the government agents from bringing their cases to the most
restrictive jurisdiction possible. This is especially important in the
context of the web, as material is often sent out by a machine and the
only current limitations on where information can be accessed from
the United States is that the location must have a phone line and an
Internet-ready computer. Further, it is impossible for the Internet
pornographer to know if his or her materials are being accessed from
New York City or Newport.
Finding members of the Internet community to serve on the jury
would be a Herculean task. "[T]he Cyberspace community is not a
community at all. It is simply a huge and heterogeneous group of
people accessing the Internet for an endless variety of reasons.""
8
115. See Section II. A, supra.
116. See Loudoun I, supra note 3, at 793.
117. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711.
118. LAWRENCE A. CANTER & MARTHA S. SEIGEL, How To MAKE A FORTUNE
ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY (1995), reprinted in L.A. DAILY JOURNAL: RES
IPSA, Apr. 12, 1995, at 16.
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Finding twelve people who are members of a world wide community
that encompasses activities ranging from commerce to discussions of
art and news to pornography, however, would be practically
impossible. Further, how would one define the standards of the
Internet community when the community is boundless?"9
Miller was decided in 1973. The Justices could not have foreseen
the computer revolution or how widespread the Internet would
become in less than thirty years. The Thomas court's application of
Miller's three-pronged test demonstrates that the test leads to unjust
results in the Internet Age.2 In the 1970's and 80's, most
pornography traveled through the mails and phone lines. Controlling
who could access the information was possible, either by not mailing
to certain jurisdictions or blocking calls from certain area codes.
Today, however, anyone with a computer and a phone line can access
information on the Internet - it is impossible for BBS operators or
web masters to block access to their information by city, county or
state.
Congress and the courts must move into the twenty-first century
and realize that the Internet cannot be governed by traditional laws.
A statute limiting jurisdiction over the Internet pornographers to the
areas where they operate or the forums which they voluntarily avail
themselves of would go far in solving this problem. Every first year
law student is taught that jurisdiction is proper when one has
"minimal contacts" with the forum, or a party has voluntarily availed
him or herself of the laws of the forum.' 2' Internet pornographers
avail themselves of the laws of the jurisdiction where they do
business, and they also have minimal contacts with cyberspace.
Finding that they have voluntarily availed themselves of every
jurisdiction where someone other than the e-pornographer has caused
their materials to travel is absurd.
The law must place responsibility on people who choose to
access Internet obscenity. Some members of communities are more
tolerant than others in the same community. If they are accessing
information in their homes, where Stanley permits them to have it,
from a jurisdiction that permits such material, there is no harm.'
119. For a lucid discussion of this problem and a call for a reworking of the Miller test,
see Douglas C. Heumann, United States v. Thomas: Will the Community Standard Be
Roadkill on the Information Superhighway? 23 Western State University L. Rev. 189, 209
(1995).
120. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
121. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
122. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1968).
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When individuals choose to access this information from public
libraries, the fault should lie with them, not the e-pornographer who
has no means of knowing if the viewer is accessing the site from a
government office, public school,'23 or with the community that has
chosen to provide open Internet access to its residents.
IV
Conclusion
Unless web sites and bulletin board system operators perform
the same types of safety checks that the Thomases did, it is impossible
to know what jurisdiction a web surfer resides in. After membership
is acquired, e-pornographers can not know if a member was viewing
the information from home or from another American jurisdiction.
Changing technology could eventually allow web masters and BBS
operators access to this knowledge. Technology should not, however,
have to be created to accommodate a standard for determining
obscenity that has been attacked since its inception.'24 Courts must
require that a defendant initiate minimal voluntary contacts with a
jurisdiction before allowing prosecution to proceed. Shifting the law's
focus to voluntarily accessed pornography, and away from those who
provide the means to access the pornography and who provide
pornography which may be obscene in some jurisdictions, but not
others, will restore control. Communities will not sacrifice their
standards by choosing to provide public Internet access.
Pornographers still will not be able to control what American forums
their materials are accessed from, but they will no longer be subject to
suit in every American forum.
123. The Thomases seemed to be headed down this path. Apparently, their site
contained a disclaimer that the materials were all legal in northern California. Presumably
viewers who thought their community standards were comparable to Northern
California's were soothed into believing their standards weren't being violated either. See
JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 2 (1996).
124. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 40.
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